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ABSTRACT 
The analysis of binary code is a common step of Man-At-The-End 
attacks to identify code sections crucial to implement attacks, such 
as identifying private key hidden in the code, identifying sensitive 
algorithms or tamper with the code to disable protections (e.g. 
license checks or DRM) embedded in binary code, or use the 
software in an unauthorized manner. Code Mobility can be used 
to thwart code analysis and debugging by removing parts of the 
code from the deployed software program and installing it at run-
time by downloading binary code blocks from a trusted server. 
The proposed architecture of the code mobility protection 
downloads mobile code blocks, which are allocated dynamically 
at addresses determined at run-time; control transfers into and out 
of mobile code blocks are rewritten using the Diablo binary-
rewriter tool.    
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.0 [Software Engineering]: General – Protection 
mechanisms. 
General Terms 
Security, Reverse engineering. 
Keywords 
Code Mobility, Binary Code, Binary Rewriting. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main goals of software protection is to prevent code 
from being observed and analysed, and then eventually illicitly 
modified and tampered with. To protect against code analysis, 
developers usually try to make reverse-engineering harder, by 
applying different obfuscating transformations [1]; attackers can 
use binary code inspection tools like IDA Pro [2] and binary 
instrumentation tools [3] to extract run-time information such as 
execution traces and memory dumps.  
To protect against illicit modifications, anti-tampering approaches 
are utilized to detect when code has been tampered with and to 
react by stopping or delaying program execution. Tamper-
resistant software typically uses built-in integrity checks to detect 
code tampering by guarding the code being executed [4] or by 
checking that the flow of control through the program confirms to 
the expected flow [5].  
Binary obfuscation techniques have been proposed to increase 
reverse engineering complexity: Linn et al. [6] proposed a tool for 
inflating binary code with redundant and/or garbage instructions 
to defeat disassemblers or to produce a very complex assembly 
code: they evaluate obfuscation strength with their confusion 
factor, as the percentage of instructions not correctly disassembled 
because of binary obfuscation.  
Aucsmith [22] proposed encryption to resist to code observation: 
his technique break a binary program into individually encrypted 
segments, so that the hash value of a block is the secret key for 
decrypting the next block; if the program was altered the hash 
value is changed and then the next block cannot be decrypted 
properly and the program cannot continue to run; in this case 
finding the first key allows recovering the full chain of keys. 
Kanzaki et al. [7] used self-modifying binary code to thwart static 
analysis and disassembling, while Birrer et al. [8] provide 
metamorphic binary code by means of program fragmentation, 
and Giffin et al. [9] used self-modifying code for code guards 
hardening.  
Online protections techniques aim at extending state-of-the-art 
static protection techniques by leveraging on software updates and 
trusted network services.  
Different online protections use dynamic code replacement to 
periodically replace the copy of the program running on the 
untrusted machine with the goal of limiting the amount of time 
that the attacker has to reverse engineer the application. 
The replacement may be implemented for the functional part of 
the program, and/or for the protection techniques used to protect 
it [10]. Collberg et al [11][12] and Falcarin et al [13] proposed 
the continuous replacement of Java and binary code respectively, 
in which the remote trusted entity frequently sends a set of new 
code fragments to the untrusted machine.  
The technique of Collberg et al [12] has some limitations has it 
relies on CIL (Common Intermediate Language): this bounds the 
scenarios in which the technique is usable (e.g., not with 
dynamically linked libraries), their composability with other 
protections, and the granularity of the code blocks. 
Previous works in Java implemented dynamic replacement of 
protection code implementing code mobility features on top of 
dynamic aspect-oriented platforms [14] [14]or by ad-hoc JVM 
extensions [15]. 
In this paper, we present the Code Mobility framework, an online 
protection technique that aims to overcome the drawbacks of local 
protection techniques by introducing mobile code. A mobile code 
block is a piece of binary code removed from an application 
before deployment. A trusted server placed on the network, is in 
charge of providing mobile code blocks to the untrusted client. 
To protect against code analysis, the Code Mobility framework 
delivers binary code to the client at run-time; the client 
application self-modifies its own code layout to install the 
downloaded code blocks, in order to thwart static analysis and 
increase the difficulty of dynamic analysis. 
The Code Mobility framework has been developed within the 
ASPIRE project [21], and it is compliant to the software 
protection reference architecture designed in the project and 
documented in deliverable D1.04 [16], which is available on the 
project website.  
The main novel contributions of this work are: 
1. design and prototype implementation with demonstration on 
standard Android code; 
2. integration with compilers commonly used for native code 
development, including in the Android NDK; 
3. integration in a whole tool-flow (of the ASPIRE project) to 
ensure as much as possible composability with other 
protections; 
4. very fine-grained code blocks (albeit with a performance 
overhead);  
5. convenient way to specify and control deployment via source 
code annotations;  
6. evaluation on real networks, ranging from local networks, to 
3G mobile networks.  
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we introduce the 
Code Mobility architecture and all its components, then in section 
3 we describe how to create offset-independent mobile code. In 
section 4 we introduce the automated tools support to instrument 
and split binary code in code blocks before run-time; then in 
section 5 we describe the performance analysis of our framework 
on different network settings, while section 6 draws the 
conclusions and discusses future work. 
2. CODE MOBILITY ARCHITECTURE  
In the code mobility architecture we designed and the prototype 
tool support we developed, a client application (which may also 
be a dynamically linked library) is stored on the user device as an 
incomplete executable that does not contain all the application's 
code. Two components, Downloader and Binder, are introduced 
for this technique: They are able, respectively, to fetch binary 
code blocks from a trusted server at run-time, and to patch these 
into the running process' memory, in a dynamically allocated 
memory area. These components are not part of the original 
application and they have to be injected into the protected version. 
This approach aims for mitigating reverse engineering: instead of 
preventing analysis of code by making the code complex, we 
make sure that the code is not available for static analysis on the 
client-side as long as possible, and deliver the necessary code only 
when it is actually needed by the control flow. The Code Mobility 
framework's architecture is depicted in Figure 1: it can be seen as 
a dynamic binary obfuscation approach based on the deployment 
of an incomplete application whose code arrives from a trusted 
network entity (the Code Mobility Server) as a flow of mobile 
code blocks; such blocks are fetched by the Downloader 
component and arranged in memory by the Binder component at 
run-time, with an unpredictable memory layout. The Code 
Mobility framework is compliant to the ASPIRE project reference 
architecture [16], defining the ASPIRE portal, which acts as a 
common entry point for all online protections developed in the 
ASPIRE project, and the ASPIRE communication control logic 
(ACCL) library in the client host, which provides native socket 
support to Android apps.   
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Figure 1 - Code Mobility High-Level Architecture 
Mobile code blocks coming from the Code Mobility Server will 
not be placed in a statically known location in the binary code 
section, but will instead be placed in dynamically allocated 
memory. So the location of the code blocks will not be fixed. This 
implies that the mobile code needs to be position-independent 
code (PIC) that can be dynamically relocated, and independently 
from the non-mobile code part of the client's binary code. Thus, 
indirections need to be inserted in the transformed code to deal 
with these variable code locations, both in the static, non-mobile 
parts of the client application and in the mobile code. Fortunately, 
only local code transformations are required for this: instructions 
will be replaced with small code snippets that can deal with the a 
priori unknown addresses at which the code has been loaded. 
Our current design only supports mobile code blocks with a single 
entry point. These can be entire procedures or parts of their 
control flow graphs (CFGs). This significantly simplifies the 
implementation of the Binder and its book-keeping data 
structures.  
We should also point out that we only make code mobile. Data 
allocated statically in the binary's data sections is left static, 
including statically allocated data that is accessed by the mobile 
code. 
2.1 Binder 
 
The client-side Binder component is in charge of invoking the 
Downloader when required. The Binder is invoked by the 
application when the control flow reaches a mobile code block. If 
that block has not been downloaded from the server yet, the 
Binder asks the Downloader to retrieve the requested missing 
code block. Through the ACCL communication library, 
implementing a socket API in native code, the Downloader 
queries the Code Mobility server in order to obtain such a block 
and finally the Code Mobility Server sends the proper block back 
to the Downloader.  
After the fetch process the Binder places the block in memory and 
makes sure that the just downloaded block will not be 
downloaded again, reducing the overhead effort introduced by the 
protection technique. Eventually the Binder redirects the control 
to the entry point of the downloaded code, where the application 
can continue normally. 
In the original client application, control flow transfers (such as 
procedure calls) to mobile procedures need to be transformed 
such that: 
1. Upon the first execution of a call to a mobile procedure, the 
Binder and Downloader components are properly invoked in 
order to obtain the code from the server; 
2. Upon subsequent calls to the same mobile procedure, the 
control is immediately transferred to the already downloaded 
mobile code.  
By avoiding going through the Binder again, the performance 
overhead of mobile code can be limited.  Figure 2(a) shows the 
original control flow without mobile code: procedure f() is 
selected to become mobile. In the transformed program, shown in 
Figure 2(b), our tools inserted a look-up table with procedure 
pointers. Look-up table accesses are depicted with dashed arrows 
whereas control flow transfers are depicted with regular arrows. 
The pointers in the look-up table either point to stubs that invoke 
the Binder to start the mobile code downloading process, or they 
point directly to the already downloaded code. All calls to mobile 
functions are transformed into a code snippet consisting of a table 
lookup and an execution control redirection to the address loaded 
from the table.   
A:
...
call f
f:
B:
….
A:
...
call table[idx]
stub ptr
stub
...
...
...
table:
Binder
· invoke Downloader
· update program base address
· overwrite stub ptr
updates
f: 
downloaded
mobile code
B:
….
accesses
(a) (b)
 
Figure 2 – Function Call: Before (a) and After (b) Code 
Mobility Transformations 
 
Initially, when the called mobile function f() has not yet been 
downloaded and bound, the address in the look-up table is that of 
a stub that invokes the Binder. 
This stub calls into the Binder, providing as argument the index at 
which this stub is installed in the look-up table. This index is then 
used as an identifier of the mobile function to be downloaded. The 
Downloader component is then invoked to retrieve the mobile 
(PIC) version of the function's code body from the Code Mobility 
Server, and stores this code body in a dynamically allocated 
buffer.  
Finally, the Binder updates the entry in the pointer look-up table 
by overwriting the address of the stub with the address of the 
downloaded code, after which it redirects the control to this code, 
and normal code continues.  
Subsequent calls to the already downloaded procedure f() then 
proceed as indicated in Figure 3. Since the Binder has already 
updated the pointer in the look-up table at the used index to let it 
point to the downloaded code, the inserted code snippet (in block 
A in Figure 3) now loads this procedure pointer and thus transfers 
control immediately to the previously downloaded mobile code. 
So for subsequent calls, the overhead is limited to the table look-
up, and the necessary spilling and restoring of registers. 
A:
...
call table[idx]
mobile code ptr
...
...
...
table:
f:
downloaded
mobile code
B:
….
 
Figure 3 – Calling Function f() passing through already 
downloaded mobile code  
 
The Binder contains three tables: the GMRT (Global Mobile 
Redirection Table), a mutex table, and a table that stores whether 
a certain mobile block is present or not (if it's not, the entry is 
zero). At program start-up for a certain mobile block its GMRT 
entry contains the address of the associated stub, the mutex entry 
is initialized, and the entry in the last table is zero. When control 
is transferred to the stub through the GMRT, it will itself invoke 
the Binder with the index for the mobile block as an argument. 
The Binder locks the corresponding mutex and checks whether 
the block is present. This is very unlikely to happen, unless 
another thread just downloaded it.  
If the block is not present the Binder instructs the Downloader to 
download the block. It then writes the base address of the 
protected binary onto the first four bytes of the mobile block, 
maps all the pages the block resides on as executable, backs up 
the current GMRT entry (which is the address of the stub) to the 
last table, replaces the GMRT entry with an address in the mobile 
block, and unlocks the mutex. As a small aside: the locking and 
subsequent unlocking of a mutex is not actually done in single-
threaded applications, avoiding unnecessary cost. 
2.2 Downloader 
The Downloader is invoked by the Binder to request a specific 
mobile code block (identified by an index) when needed by the 
client application. After a mobile code block is correctly received 
a suitable heap-allocated memory area is prepared, filled with 
mobile code, and passed back to the Binder. The returned memory 
area must be allocated with respect to a few constraints: 
· It must be memory page aligned so that the Binder can 
apply the proper access rights (execution) later 
· Every mobile block must be allocated in one or more 
dedicated memory pages so that there are no access 
right conflicts: after a page is declared as execution-only 
it should not be accessed in write mode to avoid 
segmentation faults 
The first constraint is respected by using the posix_memalign 
system call which allocates page aligned memory. The latter is 
respected by simply allocating the minimum number of memory 
pages able contain to the full mobile code block. These 
constraints result in an additional overhead (in terms of time and 
memory consumptions) because, after receiving the buffer 
containing the mobile block, the Downloader must copy it into a 
new memory-aligned one. This overhead could be avoided 
introducing a new parameterization that instructs the ACCL API 
to allocate page aligned buffers natively. Furthermore reserving 
full memory pages for single mobile blocks lead to an additional 
overhead in memory allocation. This overhead can be computed 
as: 
 
where, N is the total number of mobile code blocks transferred 
over time, ps is the single memory size, mbsi is the ith mobile 
block size. In a scenario where one hundred blocks are extracted 
from the original application the additional overhead is upper 
limited by the page size times one hundred. As an example if the 
page size is 4kB the “wasted memory” would be less than 400 kB. 
Tuning the amount of original binary code made mobile can 
mitigate this. 
 
2.3 Server-Side Components 
This component reachable by the client via a network link and is 
trustable by hypothesis. The Code Mobility Server is the back-end 
invoked by the Downloader component on the client-side. It is in 
charge of delivering requested mobile code blocks by accessing a 
repository using a given index. 
3. OFFSET-INDEPENDENT MOBILE 
CODE 
When a mobile code block is mapped into the address space of the 
binary or library, this is done on a randomized address on the 
heap because of ASLR. The statically allocated, non-mobile code 
and data of the binary or library is randomized as well. This 
implies that the offset between the mobile code block and the non-
mobile code and data is unknown at compile time. This differs 
from standard position-independent code, where the offsets 
between elements in a statically allocated segment are still fixed. 
Position-dependent code or position-independent code (PIC) in 
the original binary therefore needs to be rewritten into so-called 
offset-independent code.  
On architectures like the x86, this rewriting is straightforward, as 
one of the registers is used (by convention) as a so-called global 
pointer (GP) to the global offset table (GOT) that contains 
pointers to all code and data fragments of which the absolute 
address might be needed at some point.  
On architectures like ARMv7, however, position-independent 
code makes heavy use of the visible program counter (PC) register 
and of PC-relative addressing. So there is no fixed register 
holding a GP, and PIC code is full of PC-relative offsets.  
Figure 4(a) shows an ARMv7 assembly PIC fragment. To load the 
value at label .Ldata into memory with the instruction at .Lins2, a 
PC-relative address stored in a so-called literal pool in the .text 
section is first loaded into a register at .Lins1, and then used in 
the PC-relative memory access at .Lins.1 All edges in the code 
                                                                
1 The +8 in the PC-relative address is due to the ARM 
specification that a used PC equals the PC of the instruction that 
uses it plus eight. 
fragments of Figure 4 correspond to offsets that are known at 
compile time. For that reason, they can be computed by the linker 
or protection tool, and stored as entries in the literal pools, or they 
can be encoded as immediate operands of instructions.  
Suppose that the three instructions in red become mobile. Figure 
4(b) shows the transformed static PIC. In this example, we assume 
that enough registers are available (like r6 in this fragment) to 
store temporary values. If not, additional spill code would be 
needed.  
Instead of the original code, the first two inserted instructions in 
red produce the address of the GMRT. The next instruction loads 
the address of the mobile block from its (fixed) index in the 
GMRT, and then control is transferred to that address. When the 
mobile code block is not yet present, control will be transferred to 
a stub that invokes the Binder with the requested block index 
instead. The binder then invokes the downloader and overwrites 
the address of the stub in the GMRT with that of the downloaded 
block. 
Please notice that in the remaining static code of the shown 
example, there is absolutely no need to place the instruction at 
.Lins4 right after the inserted instructions, since the control 
transfer from the mobile code to that instruction will happen 
indirectly. Besides hiding the mobile code, this also opens up 
opportunities to obfuscate the control flow in the code that 
remains static. When code mobility is combined with code layout 
randomization in which independent code fragments (i.e., 
fragments that do not need to be allocated consecutively because 
there are no fall-through execution paths between the fragments) 
are reordered and spread throughout the whole text section, the 
fact that .Lins0 and .Lins4 belonged to the same basic block will 
no longer be apparent in the static code.  
Figure 4(c) shows the offset-independent mobile code block that 
replaces the three instructions extracted from the static code.  The 
single entry point of this code block (i.e., the address that will be 
stored in the GMRT by the Binder) is actually the third word in 
this block (marked by the .Lins1 label). The second word is an 
instruction that restores some registers and the first word is a kind 
of GP. In our current implementation, it points to the start of the 
statically allocated code and data of the binary or library in 
memory, i.e., to the .Ltext label that marks the start of the .text 
section. As this address is randomized by ASLR, it is unknown at 
compile time. Therefore it is the Binder's job to fill in this address 
in the blocks first word at run time, i.e., when the mobile code 
block is placed in the process' memory space. 
Rather than relying on the PC and a PC-relative address loaded 
from a literal pool to access statically allocated data as the 
instruction at .Lins2 did in the original code fragment, the 
rewritten code in Figure 4(c) uses the .text GP stored in the first 
word of the block, and an .Ltext-relative address loaded from the 
literal pool. Likewise, to facilitate the jump from the end of the 
mobile code back to .Lins4 in the static code, that address of 
.Lins4 is computed using an .Ltext-relative address. 
 Figure 4: Example of offset-independent code 
By combining the different redirection mechanisms discussed 
above, it is possible to rewrite all direct references, be it in direct 
memory accesses or in direct control flow transfers from mobile to 
static code or data, from static code to mobile code and even from 
mobile to mobile code.  
To handle indirect references from static data to mobile code, we 
require another mechanism, however. This case occurs when 
pointers to mobile code are stored inside static data sections or 
when they are computed on the fly to be used in indirect control 
flow transfers to mobile code. Fundamentally, the problem with 
such references is that while the origin of the reference can 
accurately be identified (in source code or in binary code, as we 
will discuss in the next section), the points of use of those 
references cannot easily be identified accurately: Once some 
procedure pointer has been computed and stored in memory, it is 
very hard if not impossible in most programs (due to aliasing) to 
decide exactly where that pointer will be used in an indirect 
transfer. Run-time solutions to rewrite all potential indirect 
transfers where code pointers are used have been proposed in the 
SecondWrite binary code rewriting system and in other designs 
[20], but all of them introduce a significant amount of code and 
data bloat, which we consider unacceptable in many usage 
scenarios. 
So rather than rewriting the code fragments that indirectly use 
references to mobile code, we propose to limit code mobility to 
regions that can only be reached through direct control flow 
transfers. In practice, this is straightforward: When we detect that 
a region we want to make mobile is accessed indirectly, an 
indirection pre-header is generated for this region. This pre-
header consists simply of a direct branch to the original entry 
point of the region, which will later on be converted into an 
indirect branch. It then suffices to replace all indirect references to 
the region's original entry point (i.e., statically allocated code 
pointers or code pointer computations) by references to the 
indirection pre-header instead. This pre-header then remains 
static, thus avoiding the whole problem, while the whole region 
itself can still become mobile.  
With the discussed transformation, the code mobility protection 
can be applied widely.  It is clear that rewriting mobile code 
references to static code or data into offset-independent code can 
introduce significant overhead, in particular when additional 
registers will have to be freed. We will evaluate this overhead in 
the evaluation section.  
4. AUTOMATED TOOL SUPPORT 
 
It is not trivial to make the described form of code mobility 
generally applicable and usable for developers that may not have 
the time to invest in complex tools and that may have to operate in 
industrial environments that put a lot of restrictions on the used 
compilers and development tools.  
In the ASPIRE project, we therefore designed a plugin-based tool 
flow that allows a developer to annotate the source code that he 
wants to make mobile, and that can be used in combination with 
open source compilers like LLVM and GCC, as well as with 
proprietary compilers such as ARM RVDS.  
In this tool flow, we make use of three sets of tools, which 
corresponds to three phases as depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 Figure 5: Code mobility tool flow 
4.1 Specifying the regions to become mobile 
First, we use source code analysis tools based on TXL [17]   to 
extract annotations from the C source code.2 The annotations are 
inserted by the programmer in the form of _Pragma directives as 
defined in the C standard since C99. Figure 6 depicts an example. 
The ASPIRE begin and ASPIRE end pragmas denote a code 
region to be protected, in this case with the code mobility 
protection. Many other protections are also supported by the full 
ASPIRE tool chain, but are out of scope for this paper. The 
regions mark by the pragmas have to follow the scoping rules of { 
... } blocks in C, but this is not problem, since C programmers are 
obviously very familiar with this scoping.  
The analysis tool extracts the annotations from pre-processed 
source code, and produces a JSON file that identifies the regions 
by means of their path and file names, their line numbers, the 
functions in which the regions were found, as well as the 
protections that were specified for each region. The tool also 
removes the ASPIRE pragmas, such that compilers will not 
complain about unknown pragmas.  
In addition, the user can edit the JSON file, for example to mark 
additional functions that need to be made mobile. Wildcards can 
be used to denote multiple functions and multiple files. This eases 
experimenting with regions, for example to find a good balance 
                                                                
2 For the time being, we only support C code because the TXL 
grammar we use is limited to C. C++ grammars exist as well, 
however, so this is no fundamental limitation.  
between overhead and protection. Moreover, it also allows the 
user to specify that functions need to be made mobile that are not 
part of the original application, but that are injected into the 
application to implement other protections, such as code guards, 
by other plugin components in a protection tool flow. A range of 
such components is documented in some of the public ASPIRE 
deliverables available on the ASPIRE website [21]. 
int f(x) { 
  int y,z,i; 
  y = 2 * x; 
  z = 0; 
  _Pragma(“Aspire begin protection(mobility)”); 
  for (i=0; i<y; i++) 
    z +=  x << i; 
  _Pragma(“ASPIRE end”); 
  z /= 2; 
} 
Figure 6: Annotation code example 
4.2 Compilation with standard compilers 
In the second phase, the pre-processed code without the pragma is 
compiled, assembled and linked into a binary or library. The 
compiler, assembler and linker are instructed to generate debug 
information in the produced object files and in the final 
binary/library, as well as a linker map file. All compilers and 
linkers we know can do so.  The linker map and the debug 
information, as well as sufficient relocation and symbol 
information need to be available in support of the third step, 
which consists of a link-time rewriting process.  
Sufficient relocation and symbol information needs to be present 
to allow the link-time rewriter to rewrite the generated code 
conservatively, i.e., without breaking the original program 
behaviour. For example, so-called mapping symbols are needed 
that identify data present in the code sections. As another 
example, relocations should not be relaxed because important 
information is lost during the relaxation process. A standard linker 
does not suffer from that loss, but an advanced link-time rewriter 
does. Some compilers and binary utilities already produce 
sufficient information, such as ARM's proprietary compilers. 
Others, like GCC, LLVM and the GNU binutils do not do 
produce it out of the box. However, about 10 small patches, 
touching only few lines of code in total, suffice to make them 
produce it.  
4.3 Binary code rewriting 
The third phase then consists of the actual extraction of mobile 
code blocks and the rewriting of all code to insert the necessary 
indirections. For this, we rely on the Diablo link-time rewriter 
from Ghent University (http://diablo.elis.ugent.be) [23]. This 
rewriter has already been used for many different applications, 
incl. fault injection mitigation; obfuscation; kernel customization; 
memory safety; software diversity; and program compaction, 
optimization and instrumentation. In the ASPIRE project and tool 
chain, it applies many protections besides code mobility, incl. 
control flow obfuscation, code guards, ISA randomization,  and 
anti-debugging techniques.  
The internal program representation in Diablo is a so-called 
whole-program control flow graph (WPCFG). This WPCFG  
includes the CFGs of all functions in the program, as well as call 
and return edges, and additional so-called hell nodes and hell 
edges that can conservatively model unknown code (such as 
library code) and unknown (or at least not precisely known) 
control flow (such as calls through function pointers).  
Diablo first builds the WPCFG of the original application or 
library by disassembling it with the help of the linker map file and 
the original object files (and the relocation and symbol 
information contained in them). After this it annotates the nodes 
in the WPCFG with line number information that it extracts from 
the debugging information.  
In the WPCFG, it then identifies the regions specified in the 
JSON configuration file. If a region has multiple entry points, it is 
split in multiple single-entry regions. Moreover, if a region is 
reachable through indirect control flow transfers such as calls 
through function pointers, the already mentioned form of pre-
headers is inserted in the code. At that point, all regions are 
single-entry regions that are only entered through direct control 
flow transfers. Diablo then rewrites all those direct transfers into 
indirect ones that go through the Binder's redirection tables.  
Next, the code inside each region is rewritten to replace all 
transfers and references to other mobile code regions or to static 
code and data by indirect, offset-independent references. 
Typically, the offset-independent references require more 
instructions, and often they need to store temporary (relative and 
absolute) addresses in registers. Diablo relies on its bi-directional, 
inter-procedural, context-sensitive liveness analysis to maximally 
find available registers in the code. If none are available at some 
point, the necessary number of registers is freed by inserting 
registers spills to the stack.  
The rewritten regions are then extracted from the WPCFG, and 
migrated to separate WPCFGs, one per region. Entries and exits 
to and from these separate WPCFGs are modelled conservatively 
with hell edges, as if each region corresponds to a library that can 
be called by unknown application code.  Once the original 
WPCFG has been split in multiple ones this way, each of them 
can still be transformed independently: The hell edges insure that 
dependencies between the blocks are respected automatically.  
For each extracted regions, multiple WPCFGs can actually be 
translated, which are then diversified with the stochastic 
diversification techniques previously documented in literature 
[18][19], incl. opaque predicates, branch functions, flattening, and 
code layout randomization. Obviously, those protections can also 
be applied to the application code that remains static, including 
the binder and the downloader.  
4.4 Current Status and Limitations 
While most Diablo transformations, including the aforementioned 
diversification transformations can handle both the fixed-width 
32-bit ARM code and mixed-width Thumb2 instruction sets of the 
ARMv7 architecture, as well as combinations of the two sets, the 
current tool support for producing offset-independent code only 
handles the 32-bit ARM subset. This is not a fundamental 
limitation however, only a matter of engineering effort. 
Diablo in general can handle position-dependent as well as 
position-independent code, and so can the mobile code support 
we implemented on top of Diablo. There is one exception, 
however. The current tool cannot yet convert position-dependent 
switch tables (a.k.a. branch tables) into position-independent or 
offset-independent ones. WPCFG fragments containing such 
tables are therefore excluded. This is also a matter of engineering 
effort, not a fundamental issue.  
The whole tool flow, including the code mobility support, has 
already been extensively tested with LLVM 3.3 and 3.4, as well as 
with GCC 4.8.1 and 4.6.4, and binutils 2.23.2 for ARMv7 
software executed on Linaro Linux, as well as with the Android 
NDK API level 18 (incl. the already mentioned compilers and 
binutils) for software running on Android JellyBean (4.3). Both 
standalone binaries (from the SPEC2006 benchmark suite, as well 
as system utilities) as well as libraries have been tested, incl. 
security-sensitive plugins for the Android DRM Framework. In 
terms of structure and other requirements, such as the use of 
GNU_STACK and GNU_RELRO segments, the generated 
binaries and libraries conform to the strict security requirements 
of SELinux. 
For the moment mobile blocks can't share pages yet. This is 
because when a new mobile block has to be loaded into memory, 
the page(s) it would be placed on would have to be mapped first 
to non-executable and then back to executable; in Android 
systems this would require a rooted device.  
In case the code from another mobile block present on one of 
these pages is being executed in another thread at the same 
moment, this thread would generate a segmentation fault. A future 
solution for this problem would be to install a signal handler for 
segmentation faults in the binary that suspends this thread and 
resumes it when the page is executable again. For this same 
reason there is also no support yet for removing mobile blocks 
from memory, but this feature can be eventually added with 
minimal effort. 
A basic version of the tool flow, including the mobile code 
support, will be open sourced during the course of the ASPIRE 
project (Nov 2013 - Oct 2016).  
4.5 Testing 
To make sure rewriting binaries with Diablo and splitting off 
mobile blocks didn't introduce any bugs it was verified whether 
rewritten applications still work correctly. For this purpose a stub 
downloader without an actual network connection was used, 
which simply maps the requested mobile block from the disk. The 
testing was done both for ARM Linux and Android, using 
Position Independent Executables. The applications used are 
those from the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark. The testing was done 
by simply making mobile every named function present in the 
binary (if that was possible). As an example more than 3000 
functions were made mobile for the 403.gcc benchmark.  
 
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
Our performance analysis was carried out for our Code Mobility 
framework on three case studies written in the C and C++ 
languages, taken from SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark, namely 
libquantum, namd and milc. Library. Tests were performed on a 
SABRE Lite i.MX6 board with a Quad-Core ARM Cortex A9 
processor at 1 GHz clock speed, with 1 GByte of 64-bit wide 
DDR3 at 532 MHz. 
To evaluate the steady-state overhead of the mobile code 
transformations, i.e., the performance overhead on an application 
in which all executed mobile code blocks have already been 
downloaded,  we used a customized version of Diablo. It 
transform the applications by applying the GMRT indirection and 
by making all mobile code offset-independent as described in 
Section 3, but it leaves the mobile code blocks in the binary's 
static code sections, but avoiding mobile blocks dumping.  
To evaluate the latency that the downloading of the blocks might 
incur, we tested four different network scenarios: Localhost, LAN, 
WiFi, and 3G. In the localhost scenario, all components were 
configured such that the server, the client, and the code mobility 
server reside on the same test virtual machine: all communications 
took place locally, in order to exclude influence of transmission 
delays from collected data and have to reference measures for the 
other configurations. 
In the LAN configuration, we tested the code on a 100 Mbps 
wired network; in the WiFi configuration we tested the code on a 
54 Mbps wireless network, while in the 3G scenario we tested it 
on a HSDPA mobile network.  
We measured the latency, i.e. the time required to establish a new 
TCP connection, whenever a new code block has to be 
downloaded; then we calculated the blocks download time to 
measure the time needed to download a mobile block on different 
network configurations. For the block download we made an 
arbitrary function mobile and measured the time needed to 
transfer it from the server to the client.  The chosen function has a 
code footprint of 412 bytes. 
Each experiment was repeated 500 times to collect data and we 
calculated average value and standard deviation of latency and 
time to download a mobile code block (see Table 1); for latency 
measures we run the code only 100 times. The last column of 
Table 1 represents the total execution time of a mobile version of 
the libquantum application. In this case we made a hot function 
mobile that represents by itself circa 50% of the executed 
operations. 
Table 1. Summary of Performance Overhead (in ms) 
Config  Latency 
Block 
download 
Libquantum 
50% mobile 
Localhost 
Average 
Std Dev 
Overhead 
0.12 
0.03 
 
9.36 
6.63 
 
369.37 
66.28 
+1.97% 
LAN 
Average 
Std Dev 
Overhead 
0.32 
0.02 
6.98 
1.46 
370.45 
65.74 
+2,27% 
Wifi 
Average 
Std Dev 
Overhead 
3.43 
2.81 
29.64 
24.49 
401.56 
68.36 
+10,86% 
3G 
Average 
Std Dev 
Overhead 
134.27 
119.58 
228.87 
154.44 
659.54 
173.42 
+82,08% 
 
Since most of the overhead comes from downloading blocks, 
which happens only once per mobile code block in our current 
implementation, and because our Android boards are relatively 
slow, we used the test SPEC inputs in our experiments. As 
expected, the worst overhead (82%) is found in case of mobile 
network connection while in a LAN scenario the overhead is as 
low as 2%. 
Table 2 shows the performance once all mobile code blocks have 
been downloaded, i.e., when the redirection via the Binder's 
GMRT table is applied to all the fragments of an application. 
For each benchmark application scenario the average total 
execution time and its standard deviation are provided, overhead 
is computed as the increment of execution time with respect to the 
original application, where no functions have been instrumented 
to become mobile. Each row indicates a different experiment with 
a significant percentage (20%, 50%, and 100%) of 
indirection/mobility, evaluated as the number of instructions 
executed in mobile functions over total number of executed 
instructions. 
Table 2. Summary of Computational Overhead (in ms) 
Execution time Average Std Dev Overhead 
libquantum 
original 
20% 
50% 
100% 
 
362.23 
363.18 
355.73 
394.80 
 
63.11 
67.93 
67.14 
62.06 
 
 
+0.26% 
-1.80% 
+8.99% 
milc 
original 
20% 
50% 
100% 
 
85,697.45 
85,417.24 
85,985.24 
88,557.82 
 
29.98 
46,73 
46.73 
133.17 
 
 
-0,33% 
+0,34% 
+3,34% 
namd 
original 
20% 
50% 
100% 
 
92,729.70 
93,403.56 
94,383.00 
95,503.73 
 
107.89 
124.05 
115.48 
119.98 
 
 
+0.73% 
+1.78% 
+2.99% 
 
In both the 20% and 50% coverage example we can see that the 
overhead is very low and sometimes even less than zero. This is 
due to the optimizations made to the code by Diablo. Only when 
100% of the application’s functions are made “mobile” forcing 
the indirection we can see a significant overhead occur. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
The main contribution of our work is the definition of a new 
software protection relying on code mobility and the full 
automation of mobile code blocks generation. Our solution shows 
that splitting program in code blocks transmitted via network by a 
trusted server is a suitable and low-cost software protection that 
can be useful in defending software programs from reverse-
engineering. Our protection creates problems for common reverse 
engineering tools and makes the code comprehension task more 
difficult for the attacker.  
The proposed solution provides stronger protection than the one 
described in previous works. First of all, the addresses at which 
the mobile code is downloaded will differ from one run of the 
program to another. This makes all kinds of dynamic attacks more 
difficult. Secondly, almost all the necessary support is already 
available to free the allocated memory of mobile code blocks, and 
to restore the addresses in the look-up table to their original 
values, i.e., the stub addresses. Once this is implemented, it will 
allow us to make sure that not all mobile code is present at once, 
and to let multiple different mobile code blocks occupy the same 
memory addresses during a single run of a program. The fact that 
addresses in the program's address space then no longer map onto 
instructions in a one-to-one mapping, also complicates many 
dynamic and hybrid attacks, e.g., because many tools such as IDA 
Pro are engineered around the central notion that every code byte 
and address corresponds to at most one instruction. 
Further research will be devoted to integrate code mobility with 
remote attestation in order to integrate tamper-detection 
techniques to improve the level of protection. Another line of 
research we want to explore is the combination of code mobility 
and software diversity. Software diversity creates many different 
copies from an initial version of a program: each copy of the 
protected program is different in its binary shape, but is 
functionally equivalent to other copies [24]. Thus, attacks 
designed to work with one version might not work with other 
customized versions. Along with parameterizing the binary layout 
(diversity in space) we will explore how to extend it with diversity 
in time, by making Code Mobility even more configurable, by 
randomizing the binary structure [25] and parameterizing the 
number and size of code blocks and their duration in the client 
code before expiring and being replaced by a new version. 
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